Verification of Intelligent Controllers using Model Checking

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(formerly RIACS / NASA Ames)





NOKIA

NOKIA 3390 Menu

Seatbelt

Brakes

Force feedback

accelerator panel

Embedded Controllers

- Everywhere
 - more and more so
- Dependability is critical
 - human risks
 - material risks
 - economic risks
- Logic (vs. physical) part is increasing

Sunroof control unit

Closing velocity (CV) sensor ~

Seat control

Adaptive cruise control Sensor cluster



Autonomy (at NASA)

Autonomous spacecraft = on-board intelligence (AI)


- Goal: Unattended operation in an unpredictable environment
- Approach: model-based reasoning
- **Pros**: smaller mission control crews, no communication delays/blackouts
- **Cons: Verification and Validation ???** Much more complex, huge state space
- Better verification is critical for adoption





Model-Based Autonomy

- Based on AI technology
- Generic reasoning engine
 + application-specific model
- Model describes (normal and faulty) behaviour of the process
- Engine selects control actions "onthe-fly" based on the model
 - ... rather than pre-coded decision rules
 - better able to respond to unanticipated situations









Livingstone

- Model-based diagnosis system from NASA Ames
 - i.e. an advanced state estimator
- Uses a discrete, qualitative model to reason about faults
 => naturally amenable to formal analysis





A Simple Livingstone Model




Goal: determine modes from observations		
Generates and tracks candidates		
	1	

breaker	bulb	meter	rank
off ⁰	ok ⁰	ok ⁰	0
off ⁰	ok ⁰	blown ¹	1
on ⁰	dead ⁴	short ⁴	8



Verify Model-Based Control?




Of course, but what exactly?

- The model?
- The engine?
- The whole controller?
- All of the above!




Verification of the Engine



- A (technically complex) computer program
 - Use traditional software verification approaches
 - Maybe full-blown proof on core algorithms
- Generic, re-used across applications
 - More likely to be stable and trustable
 - Like compilers, interpreters, virtual machines, etc




Verification of the Controller



- good model + good engine ≠> good controller
 - Heuristics in engine, simplifications in model
- System-level verification
 - Controller as black (or grey) box
 - Need a model of the environment (test harness)
 - Applicable to others than model-based




Livingstone PathFinder



- An advanced testing/simulation framework for Livingstone applications
 - Executes the **Real Livingstone Program** in a simulated environment (testbed)
 - **Instrument** the code to be able to **backtrack** between alternate paths
- **Scenarios** = non-deterministic test cases (defined in custom language)
- **Modular** architecture with generic APIs (in Java)
 - allows different diagnosers, simulators (can use Livingstone), search algorithms (depth-first, breadth-first, heuristic, random, ...)
- See TACAS'04 paper



Verification of the Model




- This is the "application code"
 - where the development effort (and bugs) are
- Abstract, concise, amenable to formal analysis
 - this is another benefit of model-based approaches
 - ... or model-based design in general



Model Checking


- Model checking = (ideally) exhaustive exploration of the (finite) state space of a system
 - \approx exhaustive testing with loop / join detection





Symbolic Model Checking

- Symbolic model checking =
 - compute sets of states,
 - using symbolic representations,
 - that can be efficiently encoded and computed.




- Can handle very large state spaces (10⁵⁰⁺), or even infinite domains (continuous time and variables)
- Example: SMV/NuSMV (Carnegie Mellon/IRST)
 - finite state using boolean encoding (BDD, SAT)



Livingstone-to-SMV Translator

Joint work with Reid Simmons (Carnegie Mellon)





- A translator that converts Livingstone models, specs, traces to/from SMV (in Java)
 - SMV: symbolic model checker (both BDD and SAT-based) allows exhaustive analysis of very large state spaces (10⁵⁰⁺)
- Hides away SMV, offers a model checker for Livingstone
- Enriched specification syntax (vs. SMV's core temporal logic)
- Graphical interface, integration in Livingstone development tools



In-Situ Propellant Production

- Use atmosphere from Mars to make fuel for return flight.
- Livingstone controller developed at NASA KSC.
- Components are tanks, reactors, valves, sensors...
- Exposed improper flow modeling.
- Latest model is 10⁵⁰ states.







Verification of Diagnosis Models

- Coding Errors
 - e.g. Consistency, well-defined transitions, ...
 - Generic
 - Compare to Lint for C
- Model Correctness
 - Expected properties of modeled system
 - e.g. flow conservation, operational scenarios, ...
 - Application-specific


Diagnosability

- Are faults detectable/diagnosable?
 - Given available sensors
 - In all/specific operational situations (dynamic)



Process Control

- Partially observable process (hidden state \mathbf{x} , estimated by $\hat{\mathbf{x}}$)
- observability : infer x from y (and u)
- commandability : impose x through u




• control theory :

x = physical quantities, differentiable

- \rightarrow linear models, PDI controllers
- logic processes :
 - **x** = states, modes, **failures**, discrete
 - \rightarrow state machines, programmable automata




Diagnosability




- Diagnosis: estimate the hidden state x (incl. failures) given observable commands u and sensors y.
- Diagnosability: Can (a smart enough) Diagnoser always tell when Process comes to a bad state?
- **Property of the Process** (not the Diagnoser)
 - even for non-model-based diagnosers
 - but analysis needs a (process) model



Verification of Diagnosability






- Intuition: bad is diagnosable if and only if there is no pair of trajectories, one reaching a bad state, the other reaching a good state, with identical observations.
 - or some generalization of that: (context, two different faults, ...)
- Principle:
 - consider two concurrent copies x1, x2 of the process,
 with coupled inputs u and outputs y
 - check for reachability of (good(x1) && bad(x2))
- Back to a classical (symbolic) model checking problem !
- Supported by Livingstone-to-SMV translator



X-34 / PITEX

- Propulsion IVHM Technology Experiment (ARC, GRC)
- Livingstone applied to propulsion feed system of space vehicle
- Livingstone model is 4.10³³ states






PITEX Diagnosability Error

with Roberto Cavada (IRST, NuSMV developer)

• "Diagnosis can decide whether the venting valve VR01 is closed or stuck open (assuming no other failures)"

INVAR !test.multibroken() & twin(!test.broken()) VERIFY INVARIANT !(test.vr01.mode=stuckOpen & twin(test.vr01.valvePosition=closed))

 Results show a pair of traces with same observations, one leading to VR01 stuck open, the other to VR01 closed. Application specialists fixed their model.






... and Verification of Software

- There is more to it than reasoning engines!
 - Device drivers, OS, navigation, communication, ...
 - real-time, concurrent, reactive, interrupts, priorities, ...
- All traditional good practices apply
 - Sound software engineering practices (requirements, design, modelling, documentation, reviews, testing, configuration management, ...)
 - Advanced software verification techniques (monitoring, static analysis, model checking, proofs)



The Program Verification Spectrum



(adapted from John Rushby)



Human Factors

- Adapt technology to its users
 - use their paradigms/languages (translation)
 - integrate in their tools and environments
 - vision : verification tools as advanced debuggers
- Technology maturation
 - From something that works to something that is usable
 - Lots of work and time
 - Polish the code but also documentation, training, etc
- Space mission adoption
 - Space missions take very conservative attitude w.r.t. new technologies (for good reason)
 - No-one wants to be the first adopter
 - Usefulness of technology validation missions



Conclusions

• Verification of **control software**

- Particularity : control loop, observability/commandability
 - In particular, failure diagnosability and recoverability

• Verification of **model-based controllers**

- **Needs** advanced verification (because of large state space)
- **Facilitates** advanced verification (thanks to model)

Model checking

- Applicable to these problems
- esp. symbolic model checking, esp. to model-based
- Delicate precision/scalability trade-off
- Verification of **software**
 - All other principles still apply



Perspectives

- Key ideas:
 - model-based analysis (model checking)
 - partial observability
- Extensions
 - from discrete to continuous, real-time, hybrid models
 - from fault diagnosis to planning
- Connections
 - with classical **risk analysis** (fault trees, FMEA)
 - with man-machine interface issues (observability!)
 - with epistemic logics (diagnoser as knowledge agent)
- Keep in touch with reality
 - scalability, relevance to practical needs, tools, integration



References

• On this talk :

Tim Menzies and Charles Pecheur. Verification and Validation and Artificial Intelligence. In: M. Zelkowitz, Ed., Advances in Computers, vol. 65, 2005, Elsevier.

- See also
 - <u>http://www.info.ucl.ac.be/~pecheur/publi/</u>
 - <u>http://www.info.ucl.ac.be/~pecheur/talks/</u>